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Abstract—The physical attributes of the dynamic vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) propagation channel can be utilised for the generation of
highly random and symmetric cryptographic keys. However, in physical-layer key agreement, non-reciprocity due to inherent channel
noise and hardware impairments can propagate bit disagreements which have to be addressed prior to the symmetric key generation
which is inherently important in social IoT networks. This work parametrically models temporal variability attributes such as 3D
scattering and scatterers’ mobility and for the first time incorporates such features into the key generation process by combining
non-reciprocity compensation with turbo codes. Preliminary results indicate a significant improvement in bit mismatch rate (BMR) and
key generation rate (KGR) when compared with sample indexing techniques.
Index Terms—V2V, Turbo codes, Social IoT Networks, secret bit extraction, key generation rate, VANETs, RSS, CIR.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
CONVENTIONAL cryptographic solutions in wirelesscommunications generate shared secrets using pre-
computational techniques or asymmetric cryptographic
protocols with additional challenges imposed upon en-
ergy efficiency, computational complexity and processing-
communication overhead during secret key establishment
in autonoumos communication of IoT nodes and within
social IoT networks [1]. Existing cryptographic solutions
are designed independently to the physical properties of
the network in which they are applied. This has initiated
research activities in the area of fast and efficient key gen-
eration algorithms based on physical layer characteristics
falling under the broad RSS-based, frequency selectivity-
based and CIR-based design approaches [2], [3], [4]. In
previously mentioned approaches the wireless channel acts
as a medium to increase key generation rate, cryptana-
lytic resistance, and quality of keys generated between end
points due to the inherent stochastic nature of wireless
propagation channels [5]. In addition, the ability to generate
cryptographic keys using these approaches is removing the
necessity to rely on higher-layer encryption protocols. These
”channel-based key” extraction approaches try to exploit the
physical properties of Wireless channels such as reciprocity
and temporal/spatial variability in an attempt to provide
the necessary randomness for symmetric key generation
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[6], [7]. In a typical VANET environment the wireless links
between nodes and co-existent adversaries experience un-
correlated channel attributes. Therefore, these channels can
offer a certain degree of confidentiality during the key
generation process between parties. The immediate effect of
this, is to reduce computational complexity and relax certain
barriers related to key management requirements. The secret
key information is usually generated from one or more
channel characteristics as part of the signal quantisation
phase. The process to determine appropriate channel met-
rics to characterise a unique wireless channel still remains
a challenging and complex domain of scientific enquiry in
its infancy [8], [9]. A trade-off also exists between quantisa-
tion performance and selection of thresholds with a direct
impact (positive or negative) to the key generation rate. The
unification of the shared secret key must also adhere to error
correction principles and valid processes around privacy
enhancement techniques in order to minimise information
leakage during message exchanges. This process assures
symmetric operation between peers and confidentiality as-
surance by minimising information exchange for the pro-
cess of correcting bit mismatch between transceivers.This
is especially important in social IoT networks considering
autonomous nature of the nodes communicating potentially
private information.
In this paper, for the first time we are incorporating
all the essential vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication
characteristics such as three-dimensional (3D) multipath
propagation and surrounding scatterers’ mobility (i.e. other
vehicles) in the key generation process. Our key genera-
tion technique can be used to establish secure communi-
cation channels within ad hoc social vehicalar networks.
We employ the comprehensive parametric stochastic V2V
channel model presented in [10] to synthetically generate
the receiver’s channel response (Bob’s channel), from which
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the transmitter’s response arises after applying the non-
reciprocity compensation technique presented in [11]. After
the necessary thresholding used to allocate bits according
to designated signal levels, we apply for the first time
in such setting (V2V channels with parametric 3D mul-
tipath propagation and scatterers’ mobility) turbo coding
(TC) techniques for information reconciliation. Significant
improvement in certain key performance indicators (KPIs)
has been achieved compared to the existing standard index-
ing technique described at [12]. For fair comparisons, that
indexing technique was again applied in conjunction with
the non-reciprocity compensation technique in [11]. More
specifically, the key generation rate (KGR) and bit mismatch
rate (BMR) are significantly improved when combining both
non-reciprocity compensation and TCs in our work.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section
2 reviews existing works in secret key extraction focusing
on error reconciliation techniques. In Section 3 we briefly
present the performance metrics employed in similar works.
In Section 4, we present the adopted key generation pro-
cess by applying TCs and non-reciprocity compensation in
V2V communication channels incorporating 3D multipath
propagation and scatterers’ mobility. Comparisons with a
standard indexing technique are further presented. Finally,
Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 RELATED WORKS
In vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) (See Fig.1), nodes
are distributed and self-organised with the majority of wire-
less communication carried out by on-board units (OBU)
integrated with additional services and processes running
[13]. High mobility of these nodes and signal diffraction and
diffusion properties render these environments susceptible
to faster fading, multipath delay, path loss and increased
Doppler frequency shift. These unique temporal and spatial
properties can generate significant randomness in secret-bit
extraction and key distribution while multipath components
of the radio channel are identical between two end points
at any given time. Also, the prediction of randomness in
these dynamic environments is more difficult that static
ones due to the high entropy bits extracted in shorter time
[14]. Different approaches have been published in the public
domain in secure key extraction protocols with different
strengths and limitations with regards to entropy, secret
bit extraction rate, key generation rate, number of nodes
and threat models. For an exhaustive comparison of these
protocols, readers are encouraged to see work in [15].
The secret key information is usually generated from
one or more channel characteristics as part of the signal
quantisation phase, including fluctuations of signal ampli-
tudes and channel phase [16], [17], [9]. A trade-off exists
between quantisation performance and selection of thresh-
olds with a direct impact (positive or negative) to the
key generation rate, entropy and bit mismatch rate. These
metrics can be affected by the time difference between
channel estimates at Alice and Bob, channel decorrelation
in time (channel coherence time), inherent communication
noise and hardware impairments [18]. The unification of
the shared secret key must also adhere to error correction
principles and valid processes around privacy enhancement
techniques in order to minimise information leakage during
message exchanges. Specifically in V2V communications
very high temporal variability takes place due to mobility
of transmitter, receiver and surrounding scatterers [10], [19],
[20]. Though disadvantageous for communication purposes,
such temporal variability can be readily exploited in the
key generation process. Signal strength variations due to
dynamically changing environments have been leveraged
in secret key extraction in [21], [22]. Authors have demon-
strated certain degree of entropy in the key generation and
exchange process under the assumption that an adversary
has unbounded capacity to estimate RSS values of the
packets transmitted. In [23], authors introduced a filtering
technique promised to maintain entropy and improve signal
correlation between communication parties by restricting bit
generation only for the period of time that that high motion-
related fluctuation is present. Movement characteristics and
their influence in RSS variation have also been exploited
for key generation in [18], [24]. The correlation between
the probing rate and key generation rate was observed in
[25]. Authors introduced an adaptive probing scheme that
dynamically changes the probing rate subject to channel-
related parameters. Authors in [26] positively correlate en-
tropy of secret bits as a function of mobility with high secret-
bit extraction rate although a single channel observation
can lead to lower average number of secret bits generated
whereas the authors in [27] model the upper bound of the
average secret key extraction rate as a function of the signal
bandwidth. Most of the approaches rely on the assumptions
that Eve cannot jam the communication channel and is not
close to either Alice or Bob.
Additional challenges have been recorded when Re-
ceiver’s Signal Strength (RSS) is used as a metric to be
quantised [11]. Typical thresholds selected usually do not
account for points in between them thus reducing the
overall key quality or information available for the key
generation process. In addition, RSS is usually extracted
by a single frequency resulting in low bit generation rates.
On the other hand, channel-phased quantisation presents
several benefits as higher level of secrecy can be achieved by
the uniform distribution of the phases on the channel taps
and increase key generation rate by leveraging the whole
2
3channel impulse response (CIR) [15]. It is also noticed that a
higher number of secret bits can be extracted that removes
the need to estimate RSS over a certain time window.
RSS-based approaches though do not require significant
hardware modifications with better overall performance in
respect to synchronisation errors. The CIR can be described
as follows [5]
h(t) =
L−1∑
i=0
hlδ (t− tl) (1)
where δ is the impulse function, L is the number of
channel paths, hl is the l-th path complex gain and tl is
the delay of the signal on the l-th path in the multipath
channel. The multipath fading channel properties in fre-
quency domain have also been investigated in the liter-
ature as an alternative way to achieve high entropy and
key generation rate. Channel state information extracted
from OFDM subcarriers has been also introduced in an
attempt to reduce random noise and improve overall key
generation rate [11]. Multiple thresholds are also used to
further quantise these average values of channel response
to generate a binary sequence. That bit sequence is then
normalised through error reconciliation techniques to assure
symmetric and identical bits within the key space. Although
this approach is generic, applies more on static nodes and
does not depend on mobility aspects making it suitable for
wireless sensor networks. A further challenge would be the
violation of orthogonality due to Doppler effect inherent in
VANETs [28].
Authors in [11], argue that channel state information
extracted within the coherence time of the channel could
be non-reciprocal due to different electrical properties of
wireless devices including antenna systems and RF front cir-
cuitry. This unavoidably prevents the extraction of symmet-
ric cryptographic keys with low-bit mismatch rate. How-
ever, the channel response in different subcarriers should
be different due to diversified frequencies. The location and
time in which channel response measurements were taken
for a specific subcarrier also differ which can be argued as
a factor increasing key randomness. Authors in [29] added
that channel information at the receiver can be modelled
as a location-dependent variable with enough information
entropy to be utilised in key generation. However, if channel
response is measured in a short period of time highly corre-
lated estimates are generated in both transmitters. A channel
gain complement (CGC) algorithm was introduced in an
attempt to reduce the disparity of channel responses. The
non-reciprocity components were identified with the use of
probe packets for each subcarrier. Authors have recorded
high bit mismatch rate when channel state information is
quantised in the time domain compared to the frequency
domain.
The randomness of signal envelope to share the secret
key between two parties has also been examined where
deep fades have been used to extract correlated bit strings
based on a theoretical analysis and simulation results only
[30], [18]*. Multiple antenna diversity has also been in-
vestigated for secret key extraction with limitations in the
key generation rate [31]. Authors* have argued that the
signal envelope can provide (to a pair of transceivers)
enough entropy required to extract a cryptographic key for
data exchange without the necessity to experience identical
signal envelops between transceivers. Although focus on
deep fades can partially overcome interference problems,
however, the quality of the symmetric key and the key
generation rate is low. Authors also limit their discussion
on the secure ways that key verification information can
be exchanged. They also hold assumptions that the size
of the bit streams between the two transceivers are the
same although calculated by different random sources. Also,
work in [30] proved to be computationally expensive when
it comes to key recovery phase that render the algorithm
difficult to be implemented in V2V communications. Their
fuzzy information reconciliation algorithm seems to remove
these constraints but the outcome is reduced entropy in
the overall quality of the key produced. Information rec-
onciliation is the process of correcting mismatch bits of the
quantisation phase by publicly exchanging information to
be used for corrective actions [32].
Quantisation and thresholding are the most important
processes in the key establishment process as they provide
initial information based on channel characteristics. Also,
these processes directly affect the bit mismatch probability
due to non-fully reciprocal but highly correlated channel
responses of Alice and Bob as a result of inherent com-
munication noise and transceivers hardware impairments.
The number of thresholds selected during quantisation also
presents a tradeoff between key generation rate and random
noise. Additional issues with fixed and multiple thresholds
were also reported such as susceptibility to active attacks
and discard of sampled values between thresholds respec-
tively [5]. Protection against active attacks has been partially
addressed in [2] with an Adaptive Secret bit Generation
(ASBG) scheme. In this approach sampled values were
divided into blocks and each block has been independently
quantised using its own thresholds based on its average and
standard deviation. Although this work seem to improve
overall key generation does not account for imperfect chan-
nel reciprocity.
Specifically in V2V communications very high temporal
variability takes place due to the mobility of transmitter, re-
ceiver and surrounding scatterers. Though disadvantageous
for communication purposes, such temporal variability can
be readily exploited in the key generation process. Two dif-
ferent techniques have been introduced in [33] namely least
square thresholding and neural network-based error recon-
ciliation. Authors recorded an improvement in the detection
of fades with smaller depth in environments with no deep
fades (e.g., line-of-sight situations). The latter technique uses
two similar bit strings to generate keys of arbitrary length
known to both Alice and Bob. The security of this system
is based on the assumption that Eve cannot adequately
reverse the training process of the neural network. A low-
cost approach with regards to channel sampling effort was
introduced in [25]. The authors modelled mathematically
an adaptive channel probing approach based on Lempel-
Zin and proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller.
Adaptation of the probing rate showed improvements in
both the key generation rate and efficiency of the probing
process.
The last step in the key generation process assumes that
3
4the information extraction about the shared key used should
be computationally expensive to adversaries (privacy ampli-
fication). Most of the existing approaches focus on different
threat models and assumptions around level of access to
the channel. “Trapdoor” functions are used as means to
assure certain level of authentication and integrity in this
process [34]. In the next, we present an overview of the most
important error correction codes that can be potentially used
in the information reconciliation stage.
2.1 Error correction codes
Error reconciliation is the next step in the secret key gen-
eration process to correct miss-matched information due
to imperfect reciprocity and random noise in the channel.
Several error reconciliation algorithms have been intro-
duced with different tradeoffs between communication and
computational complexity and throughput error correction
capabilities (e.g. Cascade and Winnow). The Cascade error
reconciliation protocol assumes that two legitimate parties
agree on a random permutation over a public channel [35].
This random permutation takes place over their shifted keys
in an attempt to evenly distribute errors. Their shifted keys
are then divided in blocks where each block does not present
more than one error based on the error rate calculated [36].
Linear error correction codes known as Hamming codes
have been also introduced in the literature [37]. In order for
a sender to transmit a message with a Hamming code the
dot product of a generator matrix and the message must be
calculated (code word). The code word is then transmitted
at the receiver who computes the product of the code word
and the parity check matrix (syndrome). If the calculated
syndrome at the receiver is a zero vector, the message was
received without any errors. In Winnow protocol [38], the
operation is much similar with Cascade. The protocol also
suggests privacy maintenance throughout the whole recon-
ciliation phase as a mean to protect information exposed
during parity and syndrome exchanges.
Low Density Parity Codes (LDPC) are known for the
low density of their parity check matrices which linearly
increases the complexity of the decoding algorithm as the
length of the message increases [39]. In LDPC codes the
minimum distance (as in Hamming codes) and the decoding
algorithm used are considered essential parameters to their
performance. In their original form LDPC codes have fixed
number of 1’s in each column k and each row j along
with the block n, known as (n,j,k) low density code. The
original algorithm developed by Gallager to generate those
LDPC matrices was deemed insufficient for large key spaces
and limited to work only with regular codes (codes with
fixed number of 1’s in both columns and rows). LDPC can
be more efficient than Cascade as they can become rate
adaptive leading to more efficient interactive reconciliation
protocols [40], [41].
The invention of turbo codes (TCs) [42] was a revival
for the channel coding research community. Historical turbo
codes, also sometimes called Parallel Concatenated Convo-
lutional Codes (PCCCs), are based on a parallel concate-
nation of two Recursive Systematic Convolutional (RSC)
codes separated by an interleaver. They are called “turbo” in
reference to the analogy of their decoding principle with the
turbo principle of a turbo compressed engine, which reuses
the exhaust gas in order to improve efficiency.
The turbo decoding principle calls for an iterative al-
gorithm involving two component decoders exchanging
information in order to improve the error correction perfor-
mance with the decoding iterations. This iterative decoding
principle was soon applied to other concatenations of codes
separated by interleavers, such as Serial Concatenated Con-
volutional Codes (SCCCs) [43], [44], sometimes called serial
turbo codes, or concatenation of block codes, also named
block turbo codes [45], [46]. The near-capacity performance
of turbo codes and their suitability for practical imple-
mentation explain their adoption in various communication
standards. In [47] the authors proposed utilizing Turbo
codes for reconciliation purposes. Further investigation in
[48] show that TCs are good candidates for reconciliation.
The efficacy of TCs with regards to their error correction
capabilities in various wireless communication standards
is also recorded in [49]. Further work in [20] demonstrate
the improved performance of TCs over Reed Solomon and
CCs which are the de-facto error correction codes used in
802.11p vehicular networks. However, this work does not
incorporate comprehensively physical propagation charac-
teristics such as 3D scattering and scatterers’ mobility which
is addressed in our work.
3 PERFORMANCE METRICS
As VANETs are inherently rapidly time-varying due to mul-
tipath propagation, this work parametrically models and
quantifies such temporal variability attributes and incor-
porates them into the key generation process. In addition,
violation of reciprocity due to hardware impairments or
other penalty factors will be compensated in the architec-
tural design and implementation. The proposed algorithmic
process will have to compensate for penalty factors influ-
encing the coherence region. The necessity for this work
stems from the research effort to further reduce bit mismatch
rate while maintaining high key generation rate in practical
VANET environments where mobility of the nodes and
large network scale imposes unique security challenges.
Three performance indicators namely, entropy, secret bit
extraction rate and bit mismatch rate, are discussed. The
later determines the rate at which the V2V channel is probed
in order to secure highly uncorrelated successive samples.
We thus present in the following the probing rate together
with the three performance indicators.
3.1 Probing Rate
The probing rate for both Alice and Bob fP = fPA = fPB
are considered the same for the purpose of channel esti-
mates collection. To achieve uncorrelated successive channel
probes, thus achieving highest entropy, successive probes
have to be taken in different coherence regions. Thus, we
must define fP ≤ umax, where umax is the maximum
Doppler frequency shift [10]. Considering single bounce of
multipath power onto mobile scatterers (e.g., other vehi-
cles), it is defined as [10]
umax =
fc
c
(uTmax + uRmax + 2uSmax) (2)
4
5where fc is the carrier frequency, c the speed of light in
free space and uTmax, uRmax and uSmax the maximum
velocities of transmitter, receiver and mobile scatterers, re-
spectively. In order to maximise the bit extraction rate, we
should investigate the feasibility of defining fP as equal to
umax.
3.2 Entropy measures
The de-facto metric which quantifies the uncertainty is the
entropy of the generated bit string. The higher the entropy
the limited the ability to deduce a secret key established by
Eve due to larger uncertainty introduced. Entropy per bit i
is defined as [5]
Hi = −p0log2p0 − (1− p0)log2(1− p0) (3)
where p0 the probability of having zero and 1 − p0 = p1
the probability of having one. Ideally, we should have p0 =
p1 = 0.5. For independent bit sequences, the total entropy
is Htotal =
∑N
i=1Hi, where N is the total number of bits in
a sequence [50]. In an ideal case, Htotal = N bits.
3.3 Secret bit extraction rate
The rate is measured in terms of the final secret-bits ex-
tracted after error reconciliation and privacy amplification.
In practice the secret bit extraction rate depends on the
probing rate from Alice and Bob and the number of secret
bits per probing. The amount of secret bits extracted in a
time varying channel is influenced by the thresholding. Con-
sidering 0s and 1s to be generated with equal probabilities
(after proper thresholding) the secret bit extraction rate will
be Rk [12]
Rk = 2fP p(A = 1, B = 1) (4)
where p(A = 1, B = 1) is the joint probability of having 1
simultaneously at Alice’s and Bob’s bit strings. However, in
this paper we consider key generation rate as the number of
symmetric keys produced per unit time.
3.4 Bit mismatch Rate
Usually BMR will be measured as a ratio of the number of
bits that do not match between Alice and Bob to the number
of bits extracted at the thresholding stage often used as a
performance criterion for the quantisation process [5]. The
BMR is measured immediately after the thresholding stage
because a single mismatch in the bitstring can render the
secret key unusable. Bit mismatch rate differs from the bit
error rate in communication theory, which represents the
number of bits received in error. The two reasons for bit
mismatch are the unavoidable inherent noise in any wireless
communication link and the violation of reciprocity due to
hardware impairments. As violation of non-reciprocity is
compensated we are left with the inherent noise as a unique
problem. This noise will add uncertainty to the transmitted
bit strings given the received bit strings. Ideally, both bit
strings should have been identical. The bit mismatch proba-
bility can be described as follows [12]
PN = 1− (1− pe)N (5)
where pe will be the probability of a single erroneous bit
defined as [30]
pe = P (B = 0|A = 1) = P (B = 0, A = 1)
P (A = 1)
(6)
where P (B = 0|A = 1) is the conditional probability of
Bob’s bit being 0 when Alice’s is 1.
4 NON-RECIPROCITY COMPENSATION AND TC
RECONCILIATION IN VANET
The key generation process presented in Fig. 2 considers
for error reconciliation the method presented in [12] and
for a first time TCs in a V2V environment. However, the
input data in our case are generated synthetically in order
to comply with V2V propagation settings.
4.1 V2V channel model
The synthetic simulated Bob’s channel response is generated
by employing the Monte Carlo simulation method [51]. For
the V2V setting the theoretical channel model that needs to
be simulated has been described in detail in [10]. Thus Bob’s
response in time domain is written as
GB(t) =
L∑
l=1
|αl|exp(jφl)exp(j2pivlt) (7)
The Doppler frequency vl is determined by
vl = vT,l + vS,l + vR,l (8)
where vT,l, vS,l and vR,l are the contributions due to Tx
mobility, scatterers’ mobility and Rx mobility, respectively.
The Doppler shift vT (R),l results from the departure (arrival)
of the lth multipath component from the mobile Tx (to the
mobile Rx). It is defined as [10]
vT (R),l = vT (R)maxcosβT (R),lcosαT (R),l (9)
where vT (R)max = uT (R)/λ, λ is the carrier wavelength,
uT (R) the the Tx (Rx) velocity, αT (R),l the azimuth angle of
departure (AOD) (angle of arrival (AOA)) and βT (R),l the
elevation AOD (AOA) with respect to the Tx (Rx) motion.
αT (R),l counts from the value −pi in the negative Y axis
returning to the same point in the clockwise direction and
βT (R),l is zero on the X-Y plane, pi/2 on the positive Z axis
and −pi/2 on the negative Z axis. Considering interaction of
the lth multipath component with a single mobile scatterer,
the Doppler shift vS,l will be [10]
vS,l = (uS,l/λ)(cosαl,l + cosα2,l) (10)
where uS,l is the scatterer’s velocity, αl,l the AOA and α2,l
the AOD with respect to scatterer’s motion.
The target is to appropriately model each factor affecting
the V2V channel response namely {|αl|}, {vl}, {φl}. In this
paper we consider a normalised (power equal to unity)
Rayleigh V2V channel with partially uniform 3D scattering
at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides with a Weibull distribution
of the mobile scatterers’ velocity. Rather than just a scenario
for demonstration, the partially 3D uniform scattering can
be further generalized to represent any multipath propaga-
tion scenario [52] whereas the Weibull distribution for the
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Fig. 2. Algorithmic process for combined TC and NR compensation
multipath power contributed by mobile scatterers has been
proved a suitable modeling approach [53]. Thus the scatter-
ers velocity, which in fact models the power contributed by
mobile scatterers, is defined as
pus = wu
b−1
S exp(−wubS/b) (11)
where b ≤ 1 is the shape parameter and w the scale
parameter. The amplitudes |αl| are constant and phases
φi are uniformly distributed in [−pi, pi], i.e., |αl| =
√
2/L
and φl ∼ U [−pi, pi] [51]. Each Doppler contribution of
Eq. 7 has the following parameters need to be modelled:
azimuth angle of departure (AOD), angle of arrival (AOA)
αT (R),l ∼ U [AT (R)min, AT (R)max] elevation AOD (AOA)
βT (R),l ∼ U [BT (R)min, BT (R)max], AOA to mobile scatterer
α1,l ∼ U [−pi, pi], AOD to mobile scatterer α2,l ∼ U [−pi, pi],
power contributed by mobile scatterers uS ∼ pus(uS). The
symbolism U [., .] stands for the uniform distribution in
the designated interval. This scenario can approximate an
urban environment with other mobile vehicles and heavy
scattering.
The number of multipath components in Eq. 7 is L=20,
the sampling/probing rate Fp = 1/Tcmin where Tcmin =
1/vmax = λ/(uTmax + uRmax + 2uSmax) is the minimum
coherence in time and uTmax, uRmax, uSmax are the max-
imum Doppler shifts due to mobile transmitter, receiver,
and scatterers respectively. In this way, we secure that the
channel is mostly probed in different coherence regions,
thus successive bits will be independent, resulting keys with
maximum entropy. We can further reduce FP as 1/Tcmin is
in fact its upper bound, however doing so, will reduce the
key generation rate, resulting marginal improvement in the
key entropy. The latter is just our perception and further
research is required, however it goes beyond the scope of
this article, which focuses on the applicability of TCs at
the information reconciliation stage and potential perfor-
mance improvement. A possible solution might be to adapt
FP = 1/Tcmin to fit in changes of the coherence region
due to variations in the propagation conditions (e.g., more
intense scatterers’ mobility, more directional propagation,
etc).
4.2 Algorithmic Process
Alice’s channel response would normally arise by simi-
lar channel probing rate in time instances such that hers
and Bob’s responses are taken within the same coherence
region. However, to further improve performance, Alice’s
response GA(t) will arise after applying the non-reciprocity
compensation model presented in [11]. Thus considering M
estimates within the same coherence region between Alice
and Bob, their channel responses are related as [11]
GA(t)−GB(t) ∼ N(0, σ2) (12)
The variance is estimated by the discrepancy of Alice’s and
Bob’s estimates as follows
σ2 =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(GA,i(t)−GB,i(t)− µt)2 (13)
where
µt =
1
M
M∑
i=1
(GA,i(t)−GB,i(t)) (14)
This method was presented in [12] where Alice and Bob
determine samples from channel estimates above and below
an upper and lower threshold discarding those in between,
i.e., lossy thresholding. We use this approach to compare
it against our TC correction process presented in Figure
2. Those estimates are samples in a form of an excursion.
The quantisation process creates segments of those samples
(also referred as excursions) of succesive bit values of 1s
and 0s. Each of those segments are created whenever a
channel probe returns a reading that does not fall inside
the thresholds. Alice selects a random set of these segments
and sends to Bob the index of the channel estimate lying in
the center of the segment defined as icenter = b istart+iend2 c
as a list La. The number of channel estimates are modelled
in the simulation and the total size for each segment has
been setup to m = 5 successive estimates that fall out-
side the thresholds (acceptable estimates). However, m is
a configurable parameter of the algorithm. For each index
from Alice, Bob checks his segments and verifies his samples
centered around that index above or below the thresholds
q−, q+ matched with Alice and generates a new list of those
indices Lb ≤ La. Bob sends Lb over to Alice. Both Alice
and Bob quantise their channel estimates at each index of
Lb in order to generate the bit-string. Thus, this method
simultaneously accomplishes thresholding and information
reconciliation.
6
74.3 Results and discussion
Part of the algorithmic operation is to develop an optimi-
sation sub-routine to adaptively change the threshold as
a function of the temporal variability of the channel. The
optimisation routine will consider several attributes such
as multi-clustered three dimensional scattering, specular-
reflected multipath components, multiple bounces on mo-
bile objects in dense propagation environments. Threshold
selection has to be adopted dynamically to the tempo-
ral variations induced by the aforementioned effects. The
thresholds should be refreshed after a specific amount of
time over which the stationarity region has been crossed.
We anticipate the refresh to take place after 10 coherence
regions because the stationarity region varies. An alterna-
tive way to refresh the thresholding process could be to
consider a Doppler spectrum correlation criterion. More
specifically, considering the normalised Doppler spectrum
as a probability distribution of Doppler frequencies, the
Doppler correlation coefficient will be defined as
ρ(X,Y ) =
cov(X,Y )
σXσY
(15)
where cov(X,Y ) is the covariance of the X,Y normalised
Doppler spectra and σX , σY are the standard deviations
of X, Y, respectively. When the correlation coefficient falls
below a specified threshold (e.g.,) the quantisation and
thresholding process will be refreshed. The first phase of
the routine developed is the construction of the Synthetic
data which will be generated via Monte Carlo simulation
taking into account the number of multiple components,
the sampling rate and total number of samples. In the
next stage the probed received envelopes are generated
considering an appropriately defined probing rate in order
to maximize the entropy in the subsequent quantisation
step. From the received data, the transmitted data are mod-
elled by considering non-reciprocity compensation. At this
stage a lossy quantisation process is preferred due to its
computational simplicity. The target is to end up with a
maximum secret bit extraction rate and entropy. For that
purpose, in the following step several runs should take
place considering the thresholds multiple pairs. A feasibility
study of both lossless and lossy quantisation processes and
their applicability in V-V scenarios is an area for further
investigation. Bob’s generated sequence after quantization
is fed to the input of a TC. During this process a single
threshold is adopted as a lossless quantisation scheme with
the potential to substantially increase the key generation
rate [30]. Turbo decoding is then performed in order to
generate a symmetric output, i.e. symmetric keys for Alice
and Bob. Performance of the reconciliation method can be
evaluated by measuring the BMR and to the Bit Error Rate
(BER) in our case. The comparison is made against the
sample indexing technique already applied in our algorithm
as discussed in subsection 4.2. We calculated BMR for the
indexing method by considering the discarded indexes after
Alice’s and Bob’s channel probing. In Table 1 we compute
the key generation rate for different key lengths. Compared
to the samples’ indexing method in [9], there was a signif-
icant improvement on both BMR and key generation rate.
The simulated BER to generate a symmetric shared key
TABLE 1
TC simulation results in secret key generation
Key Length
(bits)
KGR (with
TCs)
KGR (with In-
dexing [12])
128 35
keys/min
3 to 7 keys/min
256 17
keys/min
2 to 5 keys/min
512 8 keys/min 1 to 2 keys/min
TABLE 2
Comparison of BMR with existing RSS-Based approaches
Scheme Design Approach BMR
Patwari et al. [54] RSS-based 0.482
Jana et al. [14] 0 ∼ 0.55
Premnath et al. [2] 0.02 ∼ 0.24
Croft et al. [55] 0.01 ∼ 0.07
Zan et al. [3] 0.005 ∼ 0.02
Mathur et al. [12] 0.22
Non-reciprocity compensation
with TC (Our approach) 0.02
between Alice and Bob after error reconciliation is estimated
to only 0.0752 using TCs. Furthermore, the BMR with single
thresholding is only 0.02 whereas the estimated BMR with
the indexing technique is around 0.22 in both cases of static
and mobile scatterers. The key generation rate was also
reported high considering different key lengths requested.
For instance, the secret key rate to generate the 128-bit
symmetric key is 35 good keys per minute with TCs while
it varies from 3 to 7 symmetric keys per minute with the in-
dexing technique. As shown in Table 1, simulations proved
similar improvements for different key lengths as part of
the error reconciliation process. Satisfactory entropy values
were obtained throughout all rounds of simulation during
the key extraction process ranging from 0, 85 ∼ 0, 97 bits per
sample. Note that the BMR with the indexing technique is
nearly the same for different key lengths which is coherent
with the uniform method used by the authors. In Table 2,
we present a comparison between the BMR achieved in our
approach with existing RSS-based approaches published in
the literature.
5 CONCLUSION
We successfully combined non-reciprocity compensation
and TCs for information reconciliation as the most impor-
tant features in V2V communication including 3D scattering
and scatterers’ mobility. Results have shown significant im-
provements in key generation rate with reduced BMR when
TCs are employed against an existing indexing method.
Our proposed technique can be used in for secure com-
munication between vehicular nodes in an ad hoc social
IoT network. In future studies, we would like to further
investigate TCs for error conciliation purposes especially
in the context of social IoT networks. We will focus on
several parameters that affect performance of TCs such
as component decoding algorithms, number of decoding
iterations, generator polynomials, constraint lengths of the
component encoders and the interleaver type. Increasing the
number of iterations in the TC can significantly improve the
BER, thus generating more symmetric keys. Furthermore,
7
8we are working towards the single thresholding process by
creating a dynamic threshold that is updated according to
the receiver’s samples.
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